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FORCED CONFESSIONS.
By George L. Longfellow, Jr., of the Denver Bar
HILE the press and the public are criticizing and
defending the use of the "third degree," or "shellacking" of persons accused of crime, and the Florida
"sweat-box" case and the New York "fractured larynx"
case of police brutality resulting in death of the victims are
brought vividly to our attention, it is interesting to consider
the matter with reference to the trustworthiness of confessions obtained by such methods.
The use of such methods is obviously in violation of the
constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled, in
any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. An editorial in a current magazine abhors the existence of this constitutional rule, contending that it shields the criminal. On
the other hand, many opponents of the third degree abhor
violations of the rule on the ground that such violations are
in breach of public faith or of the rules of fair play.
We should remember, however, that criminal procedure
is not a game, that the rules are not to be observed for the
sake of good sportsmanship alone, and that the constitutional
guarantees exist, not to shield the guilty, but to protect the
innocent against forced and untruthful admissions of guilt.
The real reason for the constitutional guarantee and for the
rule of evidence excluding confessions so obtained is that experience has shown that no reliance can be placed upon such
confessions. This is for the very obvious reason that they
are not made because they are true, but because, whether true
or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to
make them. "It is a mistaken notion," stated Nares, J., in
Warickshall's Case, decided in England in 1783, "that the
evidence of confessions and facts which have been obtained
from prisoners by promises or threats is to be rejected from a
regard to public faith. . . Confessions are received in evidence or rejected as inadmissible under a consideration
whether they are or are not entitled to credit." Said Williams,
J., in R. v. Mansfield, 14 Cox Cr. 639, "It is not because
the law is afraid of having truth elicited that these confessions
are excluded, but because the law is jealous of not having the
truth." Wigmore, in his treatise on Evidence, states, "The
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principle upon which a confession is treated as inadmissible
is that under certain conditions it becomes untrustworthy as
testimony." Experience, he says, has shown that "under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality or
peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. This
possibility arises wherever the innocent person is placed in
such a situation that the untrue acknowledgment of guilt is
at the time the more promising of two alternatives between
which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk that
may be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to some
worse alternative associated with silence. . . The principle
then, upon which a confession may be excluded is that it is,
under certain conditions, testimonially untrustworthy."
The peculiar trustworthiness of a confession as evidence
of guilt lies in the natural presumption that such words
would never be uttered by an innocent man in possession of
his senses. While it may be presumed that an innocent man
would not voluntarily declare himself to be guilty of a crime
-and it is this presumption which gives a confession its value
as evidence-many substantial inducements can be offered
him for such a confession; such, for example, as the presence
of a 200-pound officer standing erect upon the victim's torso,
one heavily booted foot upon his Adam's apple and the other
upon his abdomen, both feet jouncing jerkily up and down
(See Literary Digest July 30, 1932.) We can easily conceive
of a "confession" being gasped between spasms by an innocent man in such a predicament, provided he is able so to gasp.
We can also conceive of a confession being obtained under
much less spectacular circumstances, such, for example, as
well directed and persistent blows, relentless ordeals of questioning conducted at all hours of night, and confinement in
"the hole," (a dark, steel cell in the Denver City Jail, without bed, light, or water) for an indefinite period of time.
But a confession so obtained is of no evidentiary value and
should be excluded, as it obviously was not made because of
a desire to tell the truth, but because of other inducements.
Only by falsifying concerning the circumstances under which
such a confession was obtained (a practice which is all too
common) can it be used in evidence.
If, then, a confession obtained by means of threats and
abuse is of doubtful trustworthiness, what justification exists
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for the use of the third degree? To say that it is justified because the victim, having committed a vile or atrocious crime,
only "got what he deserved," is to beg the question, for such
reasoning commences with the presumption that the accused
is guilty, and that the officers, therefore, are entitled to take
the law into their own hands.. To arrive at such presumption, the arresting officers must first constitute themselves a
preliminary tribunal to pass upon the weight of the evidence,
and thereupon may proceed to punish the accused before he
has been accorded a trial by his peers. The fairness and impartiality of such a tribunal may well be doubted, as well as
the judicial temperament and ability of such self-appointed
"judges." A peculiar inconsistency on the part of the law enforcers who resort to this method is that they place great reliance upon a confession obtained in this manner as proof
of the guilt of the confessor, but they place no credence whatsoever in the previous repeated denials of guilt as evidence of
innocence of the accused. Such denials are never preserved in
the police records, and a prisoner who persists in making them
is invariably regarded as a stubborn and hardened criminal.
In the famous "fractured larynx" case an assistant District
Attorney quotes and describes the 200-pound officer as follows:
LITERARY DIGEST, July 30, 1932, at Page 3:
"I put one foot on his neck and one foot on his belly, and rocked
back and forth. But I couldn't affect him! He's the toughest I ever
saw!"

Mopping his brow, very hot and exhausted, a 200-pound police
officer of Nassau County, Long Island, made this complaint to the
young assistant district attorney, according to the testimony of the
latter, subsequently reported in the newspapers.
Below-stairs, the prisoner, young Hyman Stark, was struggling for
breath. Four hours later, removed finally to a hospital, this latest victim
of the "third degree" perished of "asphyxia as a result of the fracture
of the larynx."
During the "shellacking" (the police prefer this term, newspaper
accounts assure us, to the ordinary term of "third degree"), the victim
had been beaten, according to an autopsy, "with a smooth rubber
hose and a piece of corrugated hose."

The conduct in that case appears to be an "improvement"
on the ancient method of trial by wager of battle, for in that
form of trial the accused was assured of an acquittal in case

167

DICTA

he survived, whereas in the modern practice of the third degree, he is assured only of the doubtful glory of a reputation
as a desperate and hardened criminal.
Furthermore, in case the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused, it is fair to say that a confession is not needed,
for an admission on the part of the accused would, in such a
case, be superfluous. But the third degree is usually resorted
to when competent evidence of guilt is lacking. Its use usually
is an admission on the part of the officers of the weakness of
the case against the prisoner. It is generally asserted that the
more efficient police departments are eliminating use of the
third degree. In England the third degree is not resorted to
and the accused often is not even questioned. The reason, no
doubt, is that efficient police departments are able to trace the
evidence, whereas the lazy and inefficient officer, unable to
track the proof, but hoping that he has caught the criminal
or someone else who will do as well, proceeds to "persuade"
the prisoner to relieve him of his task by admitting that "the
jig is up." Where the evidence is so shaky as to lead to the
use of the third degree as a last resort, can anyone say that
the prisoner "got what he deserved" because he committed the
crime? Who has right to say with authority that he did
commit the crime? Certainly not the detectives who cannot
locate the evidence. And certainly not the newspapers, whose
reporters know even less about the case than do the detectives.
It is obvious that the third degree should be abolished, not
only for the purposes of fair play, but even more for the reasons that confessions obtained in this manner are valueless
in the search for truth, and that the use of the third degree is
an admission of inefficiency.
Mr. Louis A. Hellerste'n,

March 13, 1933.

Editor-in-Chief, Dicta,
1020 University Building,
Denver, Colorado.
DEAR SIR:
I respectfully submit the following for "Dicta Observers."

HISTORY REPEATS
"CONSULT YOUR
A
LAWYER"
Yours truly,

R. W. MCCRILLIS.

